This article, written by Hilmi Musa and originally published on the Al-Jazeera Arabic website, examines the Israeli military’s challenges and the catastrophic consequences of its strategies in the ongoing Gaza conflict.
The Al-Aqsa Flood Operation, which started on October 7, 2023, has deeply shaken the Israeli state and revealed cracks in the Israeli military’s confidence. Despite the Israeli army’s overwhelming destructive power, the length and the complexities of the war, including the intense fighting in Gaza and Lebanon, have prompted Israel’s military leadership to reevaluate its strategy and rework its forces in light of the lessons learned from this devastating conflict.
Israel’s military, which has long emphasized its “small but smart” army doctrine, has come to a stark realization: ground forces are irreplaceable. The overwhelming reliance on air power and intelligence has proven insufficient to achieve decisive outcomes in this war, especially with Israel’s war objectives being thwarted in Gaza, where the situation has deteriorated into a full-scale humanitarian catastrophe.
The number of Palestinian casualties in Gaza has soared since the beginning of the Israeli assault, with at least 45,717 Palestinians reported dead, and 108,856 wounded as of early January 2025. Thousands remain unaccounted for, presumed dead beneath the rubble of destroyed homes. This ongoing violence, which has displaced nearly two million people, has exacerbated an acute humanitarian crisis. Basic needs such as food, clean water, and medical supplies are nearly impossible to access for the people trapped in the besieged enclave. The war, which Palestinians have dubbed “Operation Al-Aqsa Flood,” has resulted in the widespread death of Palestinian civilians, particularly women and children, leading human rights organizations to accuse Israel of committing genocide against the Palestinian population.
As for Israel’s military, the conflict has highlighted the vulnerabilities of its force structure. According to Maariv, the war has confirmed that no alternative exists to ground forces in warfare. It became clear that without a capable and sufficiently large ground army, Israel cannot secure its objectives or maintain an edge in warfare. While Israel’s air force and intelligence capabilities are vital, the war exposed how easily these can be overwhelmed without the support of well-equipped ground forces.
This shift in military thinking has led to the abandonment of the “small but smart” army theory that guided the Israeli military for more than two decades. The Israeli military now faces the urgent task of rebuilding and strengthening its ground forces. The first step in this process includes a substantial increase in the number of ground forces, especially in the armored corps, which has been identified as a key element of the military’s future effectiveness. The challenge is whether the Israeli army will double the size of its armored corps or pursue a more modest increase.
The Merkava Problem
When discussing the rebuilding of the armored corps, much attention is given to the production of Merkava tanks, specifically the Siman 4 model, which are manufactured in Israel. These tanks include components imported from the US, Germany, and the UK. However, global supply chain disruptions, particularly due to the ongoing war in Ukraine and the rising global demand for arms, have hindered Israel’s ability to rapidly expand its tank fleet. This situation has led Israel to postpone the decommissioning of older Siman 3 Merkava tanks, opting to refurbish and reintroduce them into service. These tanks, once slated to be sold to poorer countries or repurposed for parts, will now undergo repairs and be integrated back into Israel’s military arsenal.
However, even with these repairs, Israel faces a critical shortage of spare parts to maintain these vehicles and a broader lack of replacement tanks. Prior to the war, the Israeli army had been acquiring a few dozen new tanks annually as part of its modernization plan, but this pace is no longer sufficient given the extensive losses the army has suffered in the conflict. The Israeli military must now prepare for a prolonged and multi-front war, requiring much faster replenishment of its armored vehicles.
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In addition to its ground forces, the Israeli military has also found itself in need of significant upgrades to its artillery. Although Israel has modernized many of its weapons systems, much of its artillery is outdated, with production dating back to the 1960s. The need for more modern artillery pieces has become increasingly urgent, but the Israeli military’s ability to increase production is limited by international boycotts, which block access to key materials for weapon production.
Problems in the Air, Too
The shortage of munitions, including both smart and conventional shells, has also been a major issue for Israel’s military. During the war, the Israeli military pressed domestic companies, such as the Bait company, to ramp up production of essential munitions, including 120mm shells for artillery and tanks. However, with ongoing supply chain disruptions and resource constraints, it remains unclear whether Israel will be able to meet its ammunition demands in the coming months.
In a recent report, Maariv military correspondent Avi Ashkenazi highlighted that Israel’s acceptance of a ceasefire agreement with Hamas was influenced by the difficult situation facing the Israeli Air Force. The significant wear and tear on Israel’s fighter jets, many of which exceeded their expected operational hours during the war, will require the Israeli government to invest heavily in purchasing new aircraft. The situation is particularly dire for Israel’s older F-15 fighter jets, which have suffered from extreme usage and are nearing the end of their service life.
The Israeli Air Force has also faced difficulties with its helicopter fleet. In October 2023, only two combat helicopters were in operational condition when the war began, revealing the consequences of the Israeli army’s decision to reduce the size of its helicopter fleet over the past decade. Moreover, the Israeli Air Force faces a shortage of key munitions, such as Hellfire missiles, and is struggling to replenish its stockpiles. According to sources within the Israeli military, the Air Force budget has been reduced by 20%, hindering its ability to expand and modernize its aircraft fleet.
Israel is also planning to increase its regional defense capabilities, including converting certain reserve units into regular battalions. Furthermore, it is expected that Israel will enhance its intelligence-gathering capabilities along its borders and expand its combat engineering corps. The Israeli army has already ramped up its procurement efforts, placing five times more orders with Israeli defense companies than it did before the war.
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New ‘Lost Decade’
The financial cost of this war, already estimated at hundreds of billions of shekels (at least $100 billion), is placing significant strain on Israel’s economy. In addition to funding the rebuilding of its military and replenishing its weapons stockpiles, Israel faces the challenge of addressing the growing costs of military personnel, including increased salaries and compensations.
Economists in Israel warn that the war’s financial burden may resemble the “lost decade” that followed the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and that the government must make difficult decisions regarding the military budget. Israel’s defense budget currently exceeds $30 billion, and additional funds will be required to compensate for losses in equipment, to replenish ammunition, and to meet the costs of expanding and modernizing the military.
Meanwhile, the Israeli Finance Ministry is already preparing a program to reduce the salaries of regular soldiers, a move that is expected to spark further tensions between the army and the government. The latest proposal suggests a reduction in public sector salaries, including military personnel, by at least 2.5% in 2025. This decision will likely lead to further friction between the Israeli Defense Ministry and Finance Ministry, especially as the military seeks to secure the resources needed to rebuild its forces.
In conclusion, Israel faces significant challenges ahead as it attempts to recover from this catastrophic war. The lessons of this conflict are clear: Israel’s overreliance on air power and intelligence, and the excessive reduction of ground forces, have proven to be disastrous. Israel’s military leadership has now acknowledged the need for a larger, more capable ground army to confront the realities of modern warfare. As General Ron Tal put it: “They thought they could win wars from the air. This theory has collapsed.”
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The brutality of the war, which has led to the genocide of thousands of innocent Palestinians in Gaza, serves as a grim reminder of the devastating consequences of Israeli military strategy. The world watches as Israel confronts the reality of a war it can no longer fight on its own terms. The lessons of this war will shape Israel’s military future for years to come.
(The Palestine Chronicle provided further context to the article, highlighting the tragic situation in Gaza as a result of the ongoing Israeli military actions and genocide.)
(Al-Jazeera.net Arabic. Translated and Prepared by The Palestine Chronicle)
