By Hassan Nafaa
Hassan Nafaa, Professor of Political Science at Cairo University, argues that Trump may attempt to convince Netanyahu to proceed with the second phase of the agreement and postpone negotiations on the contentious issues.
The ceasefire agreement in Gaza came into effect on Sunday, January 19, 2025. Since the second phase, which should begin after the 42-day first phase, involves many critical issues that have not yet been resolved, the agreement explicitly requires both Hamas and Israel to enter indirect negotiations by the 16th day, February 4, 2025. It also obligates the United States, Egypt, and Qatar to ensure the continuation of the ceasefire and its successful implementation.
However, Israel did not strictly adhere to the agreed schedule, as evidenced by their delay in sending a delegation to Qatar until February 9, without the necessary authority to make decisions. This was not surprising, as despite the Israeli government’s majority approval of the ceasefire, the agreement faced strong opposition from the more extreme factions within the government. This led to the resignation of Itamar Ben-Gvir, Minister of National Security and leader of the Jewish Power party, and threats from Bezalel Smotrich, Minister of Finance and leader of the Religious Zionism party, to withdraw if the Israeli government proceeded with the second phase and refused to return to fighting at the end of the first phase.
Even Netanyahu himself has publicly stated on several occasions that the agreement does not prevent the return to fighting if necessary.
It is clear that Netanyahu felt a sense of renewed strength following his recent visit to Washington, where Trump stated that he seeks to relocate Palestinians from Gaza, emphasizing that the US is ready to take over Gaza and transform it into a Middle Eastern ‘Riviera.’ Trump even went as far as calling for Egypt and Jordan to host nearly two million Palestinians.
More concerning, US envoy to the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, stated that the U.S. intends to “reopen negotiations regarding the third phase of the agreement,” indicating that the Trump administration does not consider itself bound by what is stipulated in the current agreement, despite Trump’s continuous boasting that he played the most decisive role in bringing it about.
In such a context, Hamas must prepare for all possibilities, including the likelihood of Israel resuming the war at the end of the first phase, which ends in early March. Therefore, it is natural to raise questions about the options available to Hamas in the second-phase negotiations.
In reality, Hamas finds itself in a better negotiating position than Israel, for the following reasons:
First: The outcomes of the first phase of the ceasefire agreement, especially if all its requirements are fully implemented, ultimately benefit the Palestinian side, not Israel.
Although Israel will be able to regain 33 prisoners by the end of this phase, and its exhausted military will have a chance to catch its breath after a prolonged and shameful war against an unarmed population, the Palestinian people, despite facing genocide, will have achieved greater gains, including:
The release of hundreds of Palestinian prisoners, including dozens sentenced to life or long-term sentences.
The return of over half a million Palestinians to northern Gaza, despite the tremendous destruction they endured and the difficult living conditions they face, which itself represents a crushing defeat for those advocating for displacement and settlement.
The entry of some aid, alleviating, to some extent, the immense humanitarian suffering endured by the Palestinian people for nearly 15 months, reaching the level of genocide.
The final inclusion of the Palestinian cause on the international agenda.
Second: The decision to resume fighting will not be an easy or wise one for Israel, due to various internal and external reasons, despite its apparent use of the threat as a tool of pressure on Hamas.
Internally, it is expected that opposition to returning to fighting will increase before the remaining prisoners are freed from Gaza, and the Israeli public will likely become more convinced that Netanyahu is primarily responsible for sabotaging the negotiations. His decision might serve personal interests but not necessarily Israel’s, especially since it will almost certainly lead to the death of all remaining prisoners.
Externally, resuming the fighting could reignite protests in various countries, especially in universities and among young people, and may push many countries, including some Western ones, to take punitive actions against Israel. Even the US administration, despite Trump’s apparent sympathy for Israel and Netanyahu personally, might not be too eager to see the war flare up again in the Middle East.
Third: Resuming the fighting entails significant risks, and its outcomes are uncertain. If Israel’s military machine could have regained the prisoners by force or crushed Hamas and toppled its rule in Gaza, it could have achieved some of those goals during the prolonged fighting, which lasted nearly 15 months, especially since Israel received unlimited US support during that time on military, economic, and political levels.
For all these reasons, it is not unlikely that Trump will attempt to convince Netanyahu that it is in his personal and Israel’s best interest to move forward with the second phase of the agreement and postpone negotiations on contentious issues, particularly those related to the party that will oversee Gaza after a permanent ceasefire. This explains why Witkoff openly stated that the Trump administration does not agree with the provisions of the current agreement concerning this phase, especially the issue of reconstruction, and will push to reopen negotiations on this matter.
The original text of the agreement indicates that this phase will involve “the exchange of bodies and remains from both sides, after their identification, and the beginning of a reconstruction and compensation plan lasting from 3 to 5 years, supervised by countries and organizations including Egypt, Qatar, and the US, along with the opening of all crossings and allowing free movement of people and goods.” Trump’s actions and statements suggest he aims to link Gaza’s reconstruction plans to his broader efforts for a final resolution to the regional conflict, which is centered on his vision to displace Palestinians and transform Gaza into a Middle Eastern Riviera.
Trump’s vision aligns with Netanyahu’s views on two key issues: first, preventing Hamas from controlling and managing Gaza after a permanent ceasefire, and second, preventing the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on the 1967 occupied lands, as outlined in the 2002 Arab summit. This explains why Trump insists on US exclusivity in managing Gaza’s reconstruction process, rather than involving Egypt, Qatar, and other international organizations, as stipulated in the current agreement.
Since Gaza’s reconstruction will take between 10 and 15 years, Trump believes he has enough time during his second term to lay the foundations for expanding the Abraham Accords and reshaping the region in alignment with his and Netanyahu’s objectives, ultimately finalizing the Palestinian issue. Therefore, the negotiations regarding the second phase will be decisive for the future of the Palestinian cause.
Hamas could condition Israel’s adherence to all its obligations under the first phase, especially those related to humanitarian protocols, including the entry of at least 600 trucks of aid daily, with 300 going to northern Gaza, as well as 60,000 caravans and 200,000 tents, and the entry of civil defense equipment and infrastructure repair materials, before entering the second-phase negotiations.
Hamas can also insist that the UN Security Council guarantees a permanent ceasefire before beginning the implementation of the agreed-upon second phase. Hamas has nothing to lose, especially after the enormous destruction in Gaza and the monumental sacrifices made by the Palestinian people during their legendary resilience against the Israeli war machine. It is also their duty to ensure that Israel does not achieve through negotiations what it failed to accomplish through armed force and genocidal tactics.
(Al-Mayadeen Arabic Website – Translated and prepared by the Palestine Chronicle)
