Israeli Channel 14 reported that the investigations being conducted by the Israeli army are only revealing a small portion of the broader failure.
An internal investigation by the Israeli occupation army has revealed a massive failure in the defense of the Kfar Aza kibbutz during the Palestinian resistance’s operation on October 7, 2023, as part of Operation Flood of Al-Aqsa.
According to Israeli media, the investigation has uncovered that, when army forces arrived at the scene, they faced significant challenges related to coordination and communication with their commanders.
This disorganization reportedly led to situations where the army forces hesitated to engage with approximately 250 Palestinian resistance fighters.
The attack resulted in the deaths of 62 people, 18 injuries, and the capture of 19 others.
The Times noted that two Israeli detainees “from Kfar Aza were later mistakenly killed by Israeli troops as they tried to escape their captors in Gaza”.
According to the Israeli paper, “the probe concluded that the IDF ‘failed in its mission to protect’ the residents of Kfar Aza, largely because the military had never prepared for such an event”.
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A Timeline of the Events
According to the army’s investigation, the attack on Kfar Aza began just before 7 AM on October 7, 2023, and only ended on the afternoon of October 10.
The attack reportedly started at 6:30 AM, with a barrage of around 1,000 rockets, primarily aimed at Israeli military positions. Palestinian fighters breached 114 locations along Israel’s border barrier, with one breach occurring at 6:43 AM, which allowed them to enter Kfar Aza.
At 6:42 AM, six Palestinian fighters arrived in Kfar Aza via paragliders, flying over the border under the cover of the rocket fire.
By 6:45 AM, three Israeli military patrol vehicles were ordered to reach Kfar Aza, but one vehicle was ambushed on its way, and the other two ended up engaging fighters in Sderot.
At 6:50 AM, the fighters breached two entrances to Kfar Aza: one near the kibbutz’s solar farm and the other in the southwest. Pickup trucks arrived at both entrances, unloading fighters who infiltrated the community. By 7 AM, between 50 and 80 Palestinian fighters were inside Kfar Aza.
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By 7:01 AM, an Israeli tank stationed near Kfar Aza opened fire on the fighters but did not enter the kibbutz. By 10:20 AM, the tank was ordered to leave the area and assist elsewhere after the regional commander was killed.
Meanwhile, the members of the kibbutz’s security personnel were killed.
By 8 AM, approximately 150 Palestinian fighters had infiltrated the kibbutz.
The first group of 18 IDF soldiers from the Golani Brigade only arrived at 8:33 a.m., but it took several more hours before the situation was fully brought under control.
The probe noted that the Israeli army did not regain control of the settlement until the following morning, after the Palestinian fighters had already withdrawn to the Gaza Strip.
Moreover, the airstrikes carried out by the Israeli Air Force near the Kfar Aza settlement failed to alter the course of the fighting or prevent the attack from succeeding.
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Only 10% Revealed
Earlier, Israeli Channel 14 reported that the investigations being conducted by the Israeli army are only revealing a small portion of the broader failure.
According to Al-Jazeera, the channel noted that only about 10% of the full list of failures has been made public, with a much larger and more difficult-to-understand list still remaining undisclosed.
The investigation and the ensuing revelations have made it clear that the failure of the Israeli military was not limited to the night of October 7, 2023. In fact, the shortcomings have been accumulating over a period of more than a decade, and the channel emphasized that these failures have become deeply ingrained within the Israeli military establishment.
The Military Intelligence Division, Aman, also reportedly acknowledged that even after completing their investigations, they still do not have a full understanding of the armed organizations operating within the Gaza Strip.
Intelligence officials within the division admitted that the Israeli army entered the war without a comprehensive understanding of the enemy it was facing.
This lack of knowledge about Palestinian resistance movements is being described as a critical issue that helps explain why Hamas remains a strong force in the region.
According to these intelligence officials, this major gap in understanding is a key factor in the persistence of Hamas and its ability to continue operations despite Israeli efforts to dismantle it.
(PC, AJA)
