GAZA, (PIC)
For decades, the Zionist occupation state has pursued the policy of assassinations as one of its most important security and military tools in confronting the Palestinian resistance factions, targeting political and military leaders alike, in an attempt to disrupt the organizational structure and weaken morale and military capabilities.
However, the historical experience extending from the launch of the contemporary Palestinian revolution until the recent war on Gaza reveals that this policy, despite the human and organizational losses it causes, has not succeeded in ending the resistance or stopping its popular and military presence.
After the Israeli occupation army targeted the leader in the al-Qassam Brigades, Izz al-Din al-Haddad, on Friday evening the Palestinian debate returned anew regarding the feasibility of this policy, and whether it is actually capable of changing the course of the conflict or breaking the will of the resistance.
An old new policy
It is historically known that Israel pursued the policy of assassinations in the Gaza Strip at the beginning of the 1970s, in an attempt to eliminate the Palestinian cells that were targeting the occupation forces and carrying out infiltration operations behind the borders against settlements and army bases.
Under direct instructions from the then Israeli premier the criminal Ariel Sharon, a special unit was formed to carry out assassinations against the leaders of Palestinian resistance cells in the Strip, called the Rimonim unit, which was led by Meir Dagan, who later assumed the presidency of the Mossad, and the unit succeeded within three years in eliminating the resistance cells.
In the period between 1973 and the outbreak of the first Intifada in late 1987, the occupation army stopped assassination operations due to the significant decline in armed Palestinian action, especially inside the Gaza Strip, in addition to the fact that the army’s tight control over the Gaza Strip during this period enabled it to thwart attempts to form cells for armed action in their infancy.
Israel, however, returned to the policy of assassinations in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank during the first Intifada, the “Intifada of Stones”, which broke out in December 1987, when it assassinated 195 Palestinians during this period, whom it considered as wanted by it, and Israel was keen during this period to target military leaderships and avoided harming political levels in the Palestinian factions.
The outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, in 2000, formed a turning point in the policy of assassinations, as the occupation state assassinated between 2000 and 2006 inside the Gaza Strip 307 people, 167 of whom were targeted, while 140 others became martyrs because of their presence near the targeted persons.
The occupation army deliberately targeted political and military leaderships during the Al-Aqsa Intifada and succeeded in assassinating most of the political leaders of the Hamas Movement in Gaza and the West Bank.
In 2006, the Israeli Supreme Court legitimized the use of assassinations against leaders and activists of Palestinian resistance movements, as the court rejected two petitions submitted by two leftist organizations against the continuation of this policy.
Individuals depart and the idea remains
Despite the moral and organizational impact caused by these assassinations, the Palestinian experience has shown that the resisting factions were always able to rebuild their leadership structures in a relatively rapid manner.
The assassination of the former Secretary-General of the Islamic Jihad Movement, Fathi Shaqaqi, in Malta in 1995 did not lead to the decline of the Movement, but rather the subsequent years witnessed a remarkable expansion in its military activity in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, leading to its later transformation into one of the most prominent military actors on the Palestinian arena.
Also, the assassination of the first engineer of the al-Qassam armed wing of Hamas, Yahya Ayyash, in 1996 did not lead to the cessation of military operations, but rather the stage that followed his assassination witnessed an escalation in resistance attacks, and the launch of a series of “Holy Revenge” operations that shook Israel and destroyed all its security theories.
After the assassination of the leader and co-founder of the Hamas Movement, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, in 2004, Dr. Abdul Aziz al-Rantisi assumed the leadership of the Movement, and Israeli decision-making circles expected Hamas to enter a state of organizational confusion, but the Movement was able to rearrange its leadership quickly, and fought just two years later the Palestinian legislative elections and won them, in parallel with the continuation of its military activity.
In another model, the assassination of the chief of staff of the resistance, Ahmed al-Jaabari, in 2012 was followed by the expansion of the range of Palestinian rockets to reach Tel Aviv and Jerusalem for the first time in an intensive manner, in an indication that the military capabilities of the resistance continued to develop despite the loss of one of its most prominent military leaders.
In the West Bank, the assassination of prominent resistance figures did not lead to ending resistance operations, but rather new resistance formations and groups appeared after that in Nablus and Jenin, most notably the “Lions’ Den” and the “Jenin Brigade”, which adopted a more flexible model that is independent of traditional organizational frameworks.
Observers believe that these models reflect the ability of the Palestinian environment to continuously reproduce resistance, and that assassinations, despite their direct impact, have not historically succeeded in addressing the political and social reasons that push wide sectors of Palestinians to adopt the option of resistance.
It did not change the course
Following the announcement of the targeting of the leader in the al-Qassam Brigades, Izz al-Din al-Haddad, Palestinian writers and analysts circulated comments on social media platforms confirming that assassinations have not historically changed the course of the Palestinian resistance.
The Palestinian writer and analyst, Ibrahim al-Madhoun, in tweets via his page on X, said that the policy of assassinations, despite its gravity, has not historically succeeded in breaking the path of resistance or ending liberation movements, but rather has often led to counterproductive results, and increased the state of popular rallying around the option of resistance and its leaders.
Al-Madhoun believes that the departure of senior leaders hurts hearts, but it does not extinguish the path they made with their blood and sacrifices, for behind them are men and generations who will continue the march, and carry the trust until the promise for which they lived and became martyrs is achieved.
Other Palestinian commentators and activists also believed that the experience of the past decades proved that the Palestinian factions developed an organizational structure capable of absorbing blows, and reproducing leaderships continuously, especially after the transformations witnessed by military action in Gaza and the West Bank.
In wide discussions on communication platforms, the idea was repeated that the resistance is not a person or a group of people, but rather an extended popular state, and that the policy of assassinations has often led to strengthening the state of popular rallying around the factions instead of ending them.
Observers believe that the occupation state, despite its intelligence success in reaching a number of leaders, has not been able to achieve its strategic goal represented in ending the resistance or imposing a state of political and popular surrender in the Palestinian territories.
While the occupation state views the assassinations as a tool of deterrence and a means to weaken its opponents, a wide sector of Palestinians sees that experience has proven the limitations of this option in settling the conflict, and that the resistance, in its various forms, has continued despite the loss of its most prominent leaders over the past decades.
